I. The Number of Parties in a Negotiation
1. The simplest negotiation form is a negotiating dyad. This structure occurs when two isolated individuals—negotiators—negotiate for their own needs and interests.
1. Negotiation can also occur within or between teams of negotiators. A team is two or more parties on the same side who are collectively advocating the same positions and interests.
C. Agents and constituencies
1. Agents act not only for themselves but also for others. We will describe the negotiator as an agent and the individuals he or she is representing as a constituent.
2. A constituent is one or more parties who have designated someone else (the agent) to represent their positions and interests in a negotiation.
D. Bystanders, audiences, and third parties
1. Bystanders are those who may have some stake in a negotiation and who care about the substantive issues or the process by which a resolution is reached, but are not formally represented at the table.
II. How Agents, Constituents, and Audiences Change Negotiations
A. Audiences: Team members, constituents, bystanders and others
1. Types of Audiences
a. One form of audience is the additional team members who are present with the negotiator at the deliberations.
b. Another type of audience is a constituency - one or more parties whose interests, demands, or priorities are being represented by the focal negotiator at the table.
c. A third type of audience is composed of external bystanders and observers.
2. Characteristics of audiences
a. Audiences vary according to whether they are physically present at or absent from the negotiation.
b. Audiences may or may not be dependent on the negotiators for the outcomes derived from the negotiation process. Audiences who are outcome-dependent derive their payoffs as a direct result of the negotiator’s behavior and effectiveness.
c. Audiences affect negotiations by the degree of their involvement in the process. Audiences may become directly involved in the negotiation process.
d. Audiences also give periodic feedback to the negotiators, evaluating their effectiveness and letting them know how they are doing.
e. Audiences may also be indirectly involved in the negotiation. Indirect involvement occurs when audiences make their own wishes and desires known through the communication of their ideas but do not directly try to influence the course of an ongoing negotiation.
3. Audiences make negotiators “try harder”
a. Research has shown that the presence of an audience increases negotiator aspirations—that is, the negotiators “try harder” when they know they are being watched.
4. Negotiators seek a positive reaction from an audience
a. An audience increases aspirations because negotiators try to impress them in order to receive a beneficial evaluation.
5. Pressures from audiences can push negotiators into “irrational” behavior
a. Brown (1968) reveals the power of feedback from a salient audience on a negotiator’s subsequent behavior.
a) Brown’s research highlights the classic face-saving dilemma for negotiators: to preserve one’s image to an audience, often at high costs not known to the audience, or to lose face but conserve resources.
b) The research also shows that negotiators are most aggressive when there is a high need to regain a positive image with an audience that does not know the amount it costs the negotiator to do so.
b. Brown’s study has several important implications for understanding the power of an audience over a negotiator.
a) First, the subjects did not know the specific identity of anyone in the audience.
b) A second finding was that some students retaliated against the other party even when there was no audience present. This suggests that the opposing negotiator may act as an audience as well.
c) Face-saving dynamics can also occur when audiences are only indirectly involved.
6. Audiences hold the negotiator accountable
a. Audiences maintain control over negotiators by holding them accountable for their performance and by administering rewards or punishments based on that performance. This accountability occurs under two dominant conditions:
a) when a negotiator’s performance is visible to the audience so that the audience is able to judge how well the negotiator performs, and
b) when the audience is dependent on the negotiator for their outcomes.
B. Tactical implications of social structure dynamics: The negotiator’s dilemma
1. The presence of an audience creates a paradox for negotiators because of two sets of pressures.
a. One set comes from the constituency and team, leading the agent to be tough, firm, unyielding, and supportive of the constituency’s demands.
b. The other set comes from the opposing negotiator and calls upon the negotiator to be flexible, conciliatory, and willing to engage in give-and-take.
2. The basic dilemma, then, is to determine how negotiators can satisfy both the constituency’s demands for firmness and the other party’s demand for concessions. The answer is that negotiators must build relationships with both the constituency and the other party.
3. Successful management of a constituency therefore requires negotiators to control the visibility of their negotiating behavior.
III. Constituencies and Audiences
A. Manage constituency visibility - Negotiators can control both the visibility of their behavior and the communication process by employing tactics that appear to enhance their commitment to their bargaining position.
1. Limit one’s own concessions by making negotiations visible to the constituency
2. Use the constituency to show militancy
3. Use the constituency to limit one’s own authority
4. Use great caution in exceeding one’s authority
5. Increase the possibility of concession to the other negotiator by reducing visibility to constituencies
a. Establish “privacy” prior to the beginning of negotiations
b. Screen visibility during negotiations
c. Be aware of time pressure
6. Establish a reputation for cooperation
B. Communicate indirectly with audiences and constituents
1. Communicate through superiors
2. Communicate through intermediaries
C. Communicate directly to the other party’s constituency
1. One agent seeks to bypass the other party and communicate directly with his or her constituency to persuade those involved to change their position or the instructions they are giving their representative.
2. The agent attempts to eliminate the intermediary and communicate directly with the other’s constituency. This could be viewed as a inflammatory tactic.
D. Communicate directly to bystanders
1. Communication through bystanders may occur
a. As an explicit and conscious tactic to exert influence on the other party, but through circuitous channels;
b. As an effort to build alliances and support for one’s own position; or
c. As a result of the natural tendency for conflict to proliferate and envelop innocent bystanders.
2. Communication through audiences—particularly the media—is extremely common in major interorganizational negotiations such as intergovernmental, international, or labor–management relations.
3. Communication through the media can also be used to reach one’s own constituency to let them know the exact elements of one’s negotiating posture.
4. Communication may also be designed to activate and win over interested audiences who will communicate directly with the other party.
5. The effectiveness of communicating through audiences is determined by several factors.
a. First, the success of the tactic depends on the degree to which an audience’s outcome hinges directly on the negotiator’s effectiveness and how severe the consequences are likely to be.
b. The second factor in the effectiveness of communicating through audiences is the degree to which the audience is organized as a coherent unit.
c. Finally, appeals to audiences will be effective to the degree that the negotiator is sophisticated in the use of media relations.
6. Well-organized audiences can have significant effects on the outcome of negotiations even if their total size is small.
E. Build relationships with audiences, constituents, and other agents
1. Negotiators should try to develop personal relationships with the other party. The assumption is that it is easier to work with and persuade a friendly counterpart than an unfriendly one.
2. The better the relationship between an agent and other agents, the more the final agreement will represent long-term interests rather than short-term.
3. Informal meetings between negotiators can have several benefits.
a. When parties drop their formal negotiator roles and meet as individual people, they can discover their commonality and develop their liking for each other.
b. Agents may also stress their common fate—namely, the accountability pressures put on them by their constituencies.
c. Informal meetings permit each party to get a sense of the other’s objectives. The purpose is twofold:
a) To sense what the other side’s major demands will be
b) To develop a relationship and an open channel of communication that can be used regardless of how tense the negotiations become.
d. A strong relationship between agents should allow the negotiators to do a better job of coordinating their actions in presenting their settlements back to their constituents.
IV. Managing Agents
A. Fisher and Davis (1999) provide the following advice to constituencies managing agents, particularly those attempting to achieve an integrative outcome:
1. At the outset, the agent should have no authority to make a binding commitment any substantive issues.
2. At the outset, the agent should have discretion to design and develop an effective overall negotiation process.
3. The constituent should focus most of his or her communication to the agent on priorities, and alternatives, rather than specific settlement points.
4. The constituent should establish clear expectations about the frequency and of reporting back to the constituent.
5. The agent’s authority should expand as the agent and constituent gain insight the other parties through the negotiation process.
6. Specific and direct instructions to the agent by constituents should be put in and be available to show to the other side when necessary.
7. The constituent should instruct the agent on exactly what the agent can disclose negotiation—interests, ranges of acceptable settlement, key facts, the principal’s identity (sometimes kept secret in business or real estate deals), and so on.
Relationships in Negotiation
V. The Adequacy of Established Theory and Research for Understanding Negotiation Within Relationships
A. The adequacy of past theory and research for understanding negotiation within relationships. Aspects of relationships that could change our understanding of negotiation strategy and tactics:
1. Negotiating within relationships takes place over time.
2. Negotiation is often not a way to discuss an issue, but a way to learn more about the other party and increase interdependence.
3. Resolution of simple distributive issues has implications for the future.
4. Distributive issues within relationship negotiations can be emotionally hot.
5. Negotiating within relationships may never end.
a. Parties may defer negotiations over tough issues in order to start on the right foot.
b. Attempting to anticipate the future and negotiate everything up front is often impossible.
c. Issues on which parties truly disagree may never go away.
6. In many negotiations, the other person is the focal problem.
7. In some negotiations, relationship preservation is the negotiation goal, and parties may make concessions on substantive issues to preserve or enhance the relationship.
VI. Forms of Relationships
A. Four fundamental relationship forms
1. Communal sharing is a relation of unity, community, collective identity, and kindness, typically enacted among close kin.
2. Authority ranking is a relationship of asymmetric differences, commonly exhibited in a hierarchical ordering of status and precedence, often accompanied by the exercise of command and complementary displays of deference and respect.
3. Equality matching is a one-to-one correspondence relationship in which people are distinct but equal, as manifested in balanced reciprocity (or tit-for-tat revenge), equal share distributions or identical contributions, in-kind replacement compensation, and turn-taking.
4. Market pricing is based on an (intermodel) metric of value by which people compare different commodities and calculate exchange and cost/benefit ratios”
B. Dimensions of relationships
1. Greenhalgh (2001; Greenhalgh and Chapman, 1996) defines the word relationship as “the meaning assigned by two or more individuals to their connectedness or coexistence.”
2. Greenhalgh and Chapman’s work focuses discussion on the key factors that can affect negotiations in relationships.
a. Most of the elements can be either unidirectional or symmetrical.
b. The presence of these qualities is likely to affect how the parties negotiate, and, conversely, a negotiation is likely to have impact on these factors
c. The event may also lead to an overall increase or decrease in trust between the parties.
d. Each relationship will differ on the configuration of these qualities, which will then affect how the parties approach negotiation.
C. Negotiations in communal relationships
1. Studies have shown that compared to those in other kinds of negotiations, parties who are in a communal-sharing relationship:
a. Are more cooperative and empathetic
b. Craft better quality agreements
c. Perform better on both decision making and motor tasks
d. Focus their attention on the other party’s outcomes as well as their own
e. Focus more attention on the norms that develop about the way that they work together
f. Are more likely to share information with the other and less likely to use coercive tactics
g. Are more likely to use indirect communication about conflict issues and develop a
h. May be more likely to use compromise or problem solving as strategies for resolving conflicts
VII. Key Elements in Managing Negotiations within Relationships
1. Reputation is a “perceptual identity, reflective of the combination of salient personal characteristics and accomplishments, demonstrated behavior and intended images preserved over time, as observed directly and/or as reported from secondary sources”
a. Reputations are perceptual and highly subjective in nature.
b. An individual can have a number of different, even conflicting, reputations because she may act quite differently in different situations.
c. Reputation is influenced by an individual’s personal characteristics and accomplishments.
d. Reputations develop over time; once developed, they are hard to change. Early experiences with another shape our views, which we bring to new situations in the form of expectations. These expectations are then confirmed or disconfirmed by the next set of experiences.
e. Negative reputations are difficult to “repair.”
1. Calculus-based trust is concerned with assuring consistent behavior. It holds that individuals will do what they say because
a. they are rewarded for keeping their word and preserving the relationship with others, or
b. they fear the consequences of not doing what they say.
2. Identification-based trust - trust exists because the parties effectively understand and appreciate each other’s wants; this mutual understanding is developed to the point that each can effectively act for the other.
3. Trust is different from distrust - If trust is considered to be confident positive expectations of another’s conduct, distrust is defined as confident negative expectations of another’s conduct.
4. Combining the two types of trust – calculus-based and identification-based trust - with this distinction between trust and distrust leads us to be able to describe four types of trust:
a. Calculus-based trust (CBT)
b. Calculus-based distrust (CBD)
c. Identification-based trust (IBT)
d. Identification-based distrust (IBD)
5. Trust building and negotiations – See table 10.2
6. Recent research on trust and negotiation
a. Many people approach a new relationship with an unknown other party with remarkably high levels of trust (Kramer, 1994; Myerson et. al, 1996).
b. Trust tends to cue cooperative behavior (Butler, 1995, 1999).
c. Individual motives also shape both trust and expectations of the other’s behavior (Olekalns, Lau, and Smith, 2002).
d. Trustors, and those trusted, may focus on different things as trust is being built (Malhotra, 2004).
e. The nature of the negotiation task (distributive versus integrative) can shape how parties judge the trust (Malhotra, 2003).
f. Greater expectations of trust between negotiators leads to greater information sharing with the other party (
, 1999) Butler
g. Greater information sharing tends to enhance effectiveness in achieving a good negotiation outcome.
h. Distributive processes lead negotiators to see the negotiation dialogue, and critical events in the dialogue, as largely about the nature of the negotiation task (Olekalns and Smith, 2001).
i. Trust increases the likelihood that negotiation will proceed on a favorable course over the life of a negotiation (Olekalns & Smith, 2001).
j. Face-to-face negotiation encourages greater trust development than negotiation online (Naquin & Paulson, 2003).
k. Negotiators who are representing others’ interests, rather than their own interests, tend to behave in a less trusting way (be less trustworthy), and tend to expect that the other will be trusting (Song, 2004).
7. Trust repair
a. Since trust and positive negotiation processes and outcomes appear to be so critical, we should comment on ways that broken trust can be repaired in order to return negotiations toward a more productive direction.
b. Recent studies have also shown that following a period of untrustworthy behavior, trust is more likely to be repaired if the trust violation was not accompanied by deception.
1. Justice can take several forms:
a. Distributive justice is about the distribution of outcomes.
b. Procedural justice is about the process of determining outcomes.
c. Interactional justice is about how parties treat each other in one-to-one relationships.
d. Systemic justice is about how organizations appear to treat groups of individuals and the norms that develop for how they should be treated.
2. The issue of fairness is beginning to receive some systematic investigation in negotiation dynamics.
3. Several authors have studied how the actions taken by third parties are particularly subject to concerns about fairness (see Karambayya, Brett, and Lytle, 1992).
4. Justice issues are also raised when individuals negotiate inside their organizations, such as to create a unique or specialized set of job duties and responsibilities.
5. Rather than making things more fair, negotiated exchanges may serve to emphasize the conflict between actors who are blind to their own biases and inclined to see the other party’s motives and characteristics in an unfavorable light although we have identified these forms of justice as separate entities, they are often intertwined.
D. Relationships among reputation, trust and justice
1. Trust, justice, and reputation are all central to relationship negotiations and feed each other.
E. Repairing a relationship
1. Fisher and Ertel (1995) suggest the following diagnostic steps in beginning to work on improving a relationship:
a. What might be causing any present misunderstanding, and what can I do to understand it better?
b. What might be causing a lack of trust, and what can I do to begin to repair trust that might have been broken?
c. What might be causing one or both of us to feel coerced, and what can I do to put the focus on persuasion rather than coercion?
d. What might be causing one or both of us to feel disrespected, and what can I do to demonstrate acceptance and respect?
e. What might be causing one or both of us to get upset, and what can I do to balance emotion and reason?
VIII. A Situation with More Than Two Parties
A. A negotiation situation becomes more complex when more negotiators are added
B. In this chapter we are focusing on what happens when the parties form coalitions or subgroups in order to strengthen their bargaining position through collective action.
IX. What is a Coalition?
A. Pearce, Stevenson, and Porter (1986) suggest that coalitions:
1. Are interacting groups of individuals.
2. Are deliberately constructed and issue orientated.
3. Exist independent of formal structure.
4. Lack formal structure.
5. Focus on a goal(s) external to the coalition.
6. Require concerted member action.
B. Types of Coalitions - Cobb (1986) points out that there are several different types of coalitions:
1. A potential coalition is an emergent interest group.
a. Latent coalitions are emergent interest groups that have not yet formed into operation coalition.
b. Dormant coalitions are interest groups that previously formed but are currently inactive.
2. An operating coalition is one that is currently operating, active, and in place.
a. Established coalitions are relatively stable, active, and ongoing across an indefinite time span.
b. Temporary coalition operates for a short time and is usually focused on a single issue or problem.
3. Recurring coalitions are ones that may have started as temporary but then determine that the issue or problem does not remain resolved; hence the members need to remobilize themselves every time the presenting issue requires collective attention in the future.
X. How and Why Coalitions Form and Develop
A. When do coalitions form?
1. Coalitions form all the time.
2. Coalition formation can be analyzed in different ways.
a. Coalitions have been studied within a variety of social science disciplines, including economics, sociology, psychology, and political science (among others).
3. A classic coalition game.
4–3–2 game (Murnighan, 1978, 1982).
4. A “real world” example
a. A real-world example that parallels the
4-3-2 is the first formulation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957.
5. The nature of coalition inputs.
a. In general, people form coalitions to preserve or increase their resources.
b. The resources that serve as coalition inputs take many other forms, depending on the specific context involved.
6. The “Tragedy of the Commons”
B. How do coalitions develop?
1. Coalitions start with a founder who initiates the coalition. Murninghan and Brass (1991) suggest that there are two key propositions that affect the founder’s ability to build a coalition:
a. Successful founders have extensive networks.
b. Founders’ benefits from early coalitions are likely to be small.
2. Coalitions build by adding one member at a time.
a. He or she may then get the process started by making such offers, based on one or more of several criteria:
a) The other has something important to bring to the coalition that will enhance its strength.
b) The other wants less than other people do in order to be a member of the coalition.
c) The founder can make some form of promise or commitment to the other about future rewards or benefits to be derived.
3. Coalitions need to achieve critical mass.
a. Coalitions continue to grow through pairwise discussions and matching processes
4. Coalitions exclude members – not just add them.
5. Weak ties can be strong.
a. Research has shown that those founders who have a large, diverse network of weak ties are often in a better situation to form a coalition than those who have a small, uniform network of strong ties (Granovetter, 1973; Kadushin, 1968).
6. Many successful coalitions form quietly and disband quickly.
a. Murnighan and Brass (1991) identify several reasons why it is risky for a coalition to remain intact after the successful resolution of an issue:
b. Revenge of the Vanquished
c. Turmoil Within
d. Desire for Anonymity
XI. Standards for Coalition Decision Making
A. Coalition decision rules
1. Coalition decision rules emphasize the criteria that parties will use to determine who receives what from the results of the coalition’s efforts. Decision rules tend to parallel three standards of fairness: equity, equality, and need.
2. Those advocating an equity standard argue that anyone who contributed more should receive more, in proportion to the magnitude of the contribution.
3. Those advocating an equality standard argue that everyone should receive the same, and those advocating a need standard argue that parties should receive more in proportion to some demonstrated need for the resource.
4. In general, parties tend to argue for the standard that is most likely to serve their individual needs.
B. Power and leverage in coalitions.
1. Where is the strength in coalitions? When any winning coalition obtains the same payoff and the structure of the situation indicated that two given actors are interchangeable, those actors who appear to contribute the fewest resources, have the least power, or exert the least influence will have an advantage.
a. Strength is weakness
b. Strength is strength
2. How is power related to coalition formation?
a. Strategic power depends on the availability of alternative coalition partners.
b. Normative power has no strategic function.
c. Relationship-based power is shaped by the compatibility of preferences between two or more parties.
C. How to build coalitions: Some practical advice.
1. A practical approach to coalitions developed by Peter Block (1987), who proposed a strategy of empowerment and positive politics in organizations.
2. Enlightened self-interest, according to Block, occurs when people
a. Pursue activities that have meaning to themselves and to others.
b. Are needed.
c. Genuinely contribute to the organization and its purpose.
d. Act with integrity and tell the truth about what they see happening.
e. Treat others well and have a positive impact on them.
f. Strive to be as good and productive as they can at what they do.
3. Parties who pursue enlightened self-interest are likely to use authentic tactics with others. Block argues that authentic tactics require parties to do the following:
a. Say no when they mean no.
b. Share as much information as possible.
c. Use language that describes reality.
d. Avoid repositioning for the sake of acceptance.
4. Parties can think about other prospective coalition members in five possible roles:
a. Allies are parties who are in agreement with a negotiator’s goals and vision, and whom the negotiator trusts.
b. Opponents are people with whom a negotiator has conflicting goals and objectives, but who can be trusted to be principled and candid in their opposition.
c. Bedfellows are parties with whom a negotiator has high agreement on the vision or objectives, but low to moderate levels of trust.
d. Fence sitters are parties who will not take a stand one way or the other on a given issue.
e. The last group is adversaries; with an adversary, negotiators are low in agreement and low in trust.
Multiple Parties and Teams
XII. The Nature of Multiparty Negotiations
Multiparty negotiation is defined as one where more than two parties are working together to achieve a collective objective.
A. Difference between two-party negotiations and multiparty negotiations - The differences are what make multiparty negotiations more complex, challenging, and difficult to manage.
1. Number of parties
a. Multiparty negotiations have more negotiators at the table.
2. Informational and computational complexity
a. With multiparty negotiations there are more issues, more perspectives on issues, and more total information are introduced.
3. Social complexity
a. Social environment changes from a one-on-one dialogue to a small-group discussion. As a result, all the dynamics of small groups begin to affect the way the negotiators behave.
a) How the process evolves may depend on the motivational orientation of the parties toward each other.
b) Social pressures may develop for the group to act cohesively, yet the members are in conflict with each other and cannot be cohesive unless they can find an acceptable solution.
4. Procedural complexity
a. More complex than two-party negotiations in that the process they have to follow is more complicated.
5. Strategic complexity
a. In a group negotiation, complexity increases significantly. The negotiator must consider the strategies of all the other parties at the table and decide whether to deal with each of them separately or as a group.
b. The actual process of dealing with each of them usually evolves into a series of one-on-one negotiations, which can have several consequences.
a) First, these exchanges are subject to the surveillance and audience dynamics
b) Second, negotiators who have some way to control the number of parties at the table may begin to act strategically, using this control to serve their objectives.
c) Third, negotiators can explicitly engage in coalition building as a way to marshal support.
B. What is an effective group? Schwartz (1994) suggests that effective groups and their members do the following things:
1. Test assumptions and inferences.
2. Share all relevant information.
3. Focus on interests, not positions.
4. Be specific—use examples.
5. Agree on what important words mean.
6. Explain the reasons behind one’s statements, questions, and answers.
7. Disagree openly with any member of the group.
8. Make statements, then invite questions and comments.
9. Jointly design ways to test disagreements and solutions.
10. Discuss undiscussable issues.
11. Keep the discussion focused.
12. Do not take cheap shots or otherwise distract the group.
13. Expect to have all members participate in all phases of the process.
14. Exchange relevant information with nongroup members.
15. Make decisions by consensus.
16. Conduct a self-critique.
XIII. Managing Multiparty Negotiations
A. The prenegotiation stage. This state is characterized by a lot of informal contact among the parties.
1. Participants – the parties must agree on who is going to be invited to the talks.
2. Coalitions exist before negotiations begin or for coalitions to organized in anticipation of the meeting of all the parties.
3. Defining group member roles - Group members can play a number of different roles in a group.three types of roles that members can play—
a. Rask roles, which move the group along toward a decision or conclusion;
b. Relationship roles, which manage and sustain good relationships between group members, and
c. Self-oriented roles, which serve to bring attention to the individual group member, often at the expense of group effectiveness.
4. Understanding the costs and consequences of no agreement.
a. In multiparty negotiations, the perceptual biases that negotiators are prone to, are likely to affect negotiators by inflating their sense of power and ability to win—leading them to believe that the no-agreement alternative is much better than it really is.
5. Learning the issues and constructing an agenda.
a. There are many reasons why an agenda can be an effective decision aid:
a) It establishes the issues that will be discussed.
b) Depending on how the issues are worded, it can also define how each issue is discussed
c) It can define the order in which issues are discussed.
d) It can be used to introduce process issues as well as substantive issues, simply by including them.
e) It can assign time limits to various items, thereby indicating the importance of the different issues.
B. The formal negotiation stage – managing the group process and outcome.
1. Appoint an appropriate chair.
2. Use and restructure the agenda.
3. Ensure a diversity of information and perspectives.
a. Effective management of the process of sharing diverse views on the task is critical to achieving effective sharing of a diversity of views and perspectives on the problem.
Ancona and (1988) suggest four group-member roles that may be useful during this information management phase: scouts, ambassadors, coordinators, and guards. Caldwell
c. Manz, Neck, Mancuso, and Manz (1997) suggest key process steps that a chair can implement to assure having an effective, amicable disagreement on a team:
a) Collect your thoughts and composure before speaking.
b) Try to understand the other person’s position.
c) Try to think of ways that you both can win.
d) Consider how important this issue is to you.
e) Remember that you will probably have to work together with these people in the future.
4. Ensure consideration of all the available information. Group norms can undermine an effective discussion:
a. Unwillingness to tolerate conflicting points of view and perspectives.
b. No means for defusing an emotionally charged discussion.
c. Coming to a meeting unprepared.
5. Bazerman, Mannix, and Thompson (1988) reviewed several group decision-making and brainstorming techniques that are frequently used to achieve this objective:
a. The delphi technique – a moderator structures an initial questionnaire and sends it out to all parties, asking for input.
b. Brainstorming – parties are instructed to define a problem and then to generate as many solutions as possible without criticizing any of them.
c. Nominal group technique – typically follows brainstorming.
6. Manage conflict effectively - groups must generate many ideas and approaches to a problem—which usually creates conflict—while not allowing that conflict to either disrupt the information flow or create personal animosity.
7. Review and manage the decision rules – the parties also need to manage the decision rules – that is, the way the group will decide what to do (Brett, 1991).
a. Table 13.3 presents a chart that summarizes the three different negotiating strategies and the related tactics, decision rules, goal orientations, and decision aids.
8. Strive for a first agreement – consensus or the best quality solution, negotiators should not strive to achieve it all at once.
9. Manage problem team members – Manz et. al (1997) suggest the following tactics for dealing with problem team members:
a. Be specific about the problem behavior—offer clear, specific examples.
b. Phrase the problem as one that is affecting the entire team, rather than just you.
c. Focus on behaviors the other can control.
d. Wait to give constructive criticism until the individual can truly hear and accept it.
e. Keep feedback professional. Use a civil tone and describe the offending behavior and its impact specifically.
f. Make sure the other has heard and understood your comments
C. The agreement phase
1. During the agreement stage, the parties must select among the alternatives on the table.
2. Schwartz (1994) suggests that four key problem-solving steps occur during this phase:
a. Select the best solution.
b. Develop an action plan.
c. Implement the action plan.
d. Evaluate outcomes and the process.
3. What the Chair Can Do to Help
a. Move the group toward selecting one or more of the options.
b. Shape and draft the tentative agreement.
c. Discuss whatever implementation and follow-up or next steps need to occur.
d. Thank the group for their participation, their hard work, and their efforts.
e. Organize and facilitate the postmortem.
XIV. Interteam Negotiations
A. Integrative agreements are more likely when teams are involved.
B. Teams are sometimes more competitive than individuals, and may claim more value.
C. Accountability pressures are different for teams compared to individuals.
D. The relationship among team members affects negotiation process and outcomes.